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SUMMARY
In the present report, which has been updated since the advance unedited
version was made public on 17 February 2011, the Special Rapporteur on the
rights of indigenous peoples examines the situation of Maori people in New
Zealand on the basis of information received during his visit to the country from
18-23 July 2010 and independent research. The visit was carried out in follow-up
to the 2005 visit of the previous Special Rapporteur, Rodolfo Stavenhagen. The
principal focus of the report is an examination of the process for settling historical
and contemporary claims based on the Treaty of Waitangi, although other key
issues are also addressed.
Especially in recent years, New Zealand has made significant strides to
advance the rights of Maori people and to address concerns raised by the former
Special Rapporteur. These include New Zealand's expression of support for the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, its steps to
repeal and reform the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act, and its efforts to carry out
a constitutional review process with respect to issues related to Maori people.
Further efforts to advance Maori rights should be consolidated and
strengthened, and the Special Rapporteur will continue to monitor developments
in this regard. The Special Rapporteur emphasizes the need for the principles
enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi and related, internationally protected human
rights to be provided security within the domestic legal system of New Zealand so
that these rights are not vulnerable to political discretion. Also, the new Marine
and Coastal Area Act, adopted on 31 March 2011, should be implemented in line
with international standards regarding the rights of indigenous peoples to their
traditional lands and resources.
Additionally, efforts to secure Maori political participation at the national
level should be strengthened, and the State should focus special attention on
increasing Maori participation in local governance. New Zealand should also
ensure that consultations with Maori on matters affecting them are applied
consistently and in accordance with relevant international standards and
traditional Maori decision-making procedures.
The Treaty settlement process in New Zealand, despite evident
shortcomings, is one of the most important examples in the world of an effort to
address historical and ongoing grievances of indigenous peoples, and settlements
already achieved have provided significant benefits in several cases. However,
steps need to be taken to strengthen this process. It is necessary to ensure funding
for the Waitangi Tribunal so that it can resolve its pending caseload of historical
grievances in an efficient and timely manner.
Furthermore, with respect to Treaty settlement negotiations, the
Government should make every effort to involve all groups that have an interest in
the issues under consideration. Also, the Special Rapporteur encourages the
Government to show flexibility in its positions during settlement negotiations. In
consultation with Maori, the Government should explore and develop means of
addressing Maori concerns regarding the Treaty settlement negotiation process,
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especially the perceived imbalance of power between Maori and Government
negotiators.
Finally, the Special Rapporteur cannot help but note the extreme
disadvantage in the social and economic conditions of Maori people in
comparison to the rest of New Zealand society. While some positive
developments have been achieved since the visit of the former Special Rapporteur,
more remains to be done to achieve the increased social and economic parity that
is necessary for Maori and non-Maori New Zealanders to move forward as true
partners in the future, as contemplated under the Treaty of Waitangi.

1. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report examines the situation of Maori people in New
Zealand on the basis of information received during the visit of the Special
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples to the country from 18 to 23 July
2010 and independent research. The visit was carried out in follow-up to the 2005
visit of the previous Special Rapporteur, Rodolfo Stavenhagen. It should be noted
that the Special Rapporteur does not purport to address in the present report all
issues related to Maori people in New Zealand, or even all of the issues covered
by the previous Special Rapporteur in his 2006 report (E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3).
The principal focus of the report is an examination of the process for settling
historical and contemporary claims based on the Treaty of Waitangi, although
other key issues that were raised by both Maori and Government representatives
are also addressed.
2. During his visit, the Special Rapporteur travelled to Auckland,
Wellington, Waitangi, Hamilton and Whanganui, and met with the Prime
Minister, the Minister of Maori Affairs, and the Minister of Justice, the Minister
of Corrections and the Minister of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, as well as
with members of Parliament, the Waitangi Tribunal, the Maori Land Court, and
the Human Rights Commission. Additionally, the Special Rapporteur spoke with
representatives of Maori groups, including Whanganui, Ngai Tuhoe, Tainui and
Nga Puhi. Finally, the Special Rapporteur met with members of the Maori Party,
the Iwi Chairs Forum and the Maori Economic Taskforce, and with King Tuheitia,
about issues affecting Maori people across New Zealand. The Special Rapporteur
would like to express his appreciation to the Government for its support and to the
indigenous individuals and organizations for their indispensible assistance in the
planning and coordination of the visit.
3. Many of the concerns raised by the former Special Rapporteur have been
the subject of concerted efforts by the Government, which are discussed
throughout the present report. The Special Rapporteur makes particular note of the
expression of support by New Zealand of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples during the annual session of the Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues in April 2010. Reversing New Zealand's earlier position on
the Declaration, the country's Minister of Maori Affairs issued a public statement
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pledging Government support for the Declaration, which it cited as "both an
affirmation of fundamental rights and an expression of new and widely supported
aspirations" (see www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/hr5O12.doc.htm). In the
statement, the Minister also acknowledged that Maori held a distinct and special
status as the indigenous people of New Zealand and affirmed that the Treaty of
Waitangi establishes a foundation of partnership, mutual respect, cooperation and
good faith between Maori and the Government.

II. MAORI PEOPLE
4. Maori are the original inhabitants of New Zealand (Aotearoa). They are
believed to have arrived on the islands as early as A.D. 800, with a large mass
arrival from East Polynesia in around 1300. The Maori population dropped
significantly in the years following colonization, and by 1901, it had fallen to
45,000. Today, Maori comprise approximately 15 per cent (575,000) of New
Zealand's population of 4.25 million. Nearly one quarter of the Maori population
lives in the greater Auckland area. The smallest unit of Maori social organization
is the extended family or whanau, and several whanau make up a clan or hapu,
and several hapu make up a tribe, or iwi.
5. Maori tradition encompasses the concept of turangawaewae ("a place to
stand"), which indicates a close connection between land, tribal and personal
identity. Traditionally, Maori livelihood was based heavily on fishing and hunting,
as well as on cultivating plants, with agricultural areas located near good fishing
and birding locations. Under the traditional Maori land tenure system, land was
held by tribal groups, but an individual or a family could claim the right to use an
area for a garden, catching birds or fish, cutting down a tree or building a house.
6. The colonization of New Zealand by the British and the subsequent
policies adopted by the colonial and New Zealand Governments led to the
widespread loss and alienation of Maori land, and assaulted the social and cultural
fabric of Maori communities. This history is reflected in the disadvantage
currently faced by Maori people in relation to the non-indigenous population,
across a range of indicators, as discussed further in section IV below. Despite this,
Maori continue to possess a strong and vibrant culture, enriching New Zealand
society as a whole.

III. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI
A. Background
7. Relationships between Maori and the New Zealand Government are
grounded in and guided by the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, which is understood to
be one of the country's founding instruments. While the constitutional status of
the Treaty of Waitangi is the subject of ongoing debate in New Zealand, as
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discussed further in section IV below, the Treaty of Waitangi has an important
place in the legal framework of New Zealand and has been described as part of the
fabric of New Zealand society.
8. The Treaty was written in both English and Maori, and there are
important differences in some of its core provisions in the two versions. Most
significantly, in the English version, Maori conveyed "sovereignty" to the British
Crown (art. 1); but in the Maori version, they conveyed "kawanatanga"
(governorship), but retained "tino rangatiratanga" (chieftainship, a concept
somewhat analogous to self-determination) over their lands, villages and taonga
(treasures). Thus, many Maori believe that they retained sovereignty and gave
away only limited rights of government to the Crown.
9. In part due to the differences in interpretation in the two texts, most
contemporary legislative references to the Treaty of Waitangi refer to the
principles of the Treaty, rather than the Treaty provisions themselves. The
dominant principles articulated by New Zealand courts, though understood to be
evolving, are: partnership, which includes a duty of both parties to act reasonably,
honourably and in good faith; active protection, which requires the Government to
protect Maori interests, although the degree of the obligation of the Government
to protect depends on the circumstances of the situation and on the vulnerability of
the taonga involved in the situation; and redress, which requires the Government
to take active and positive steps to redress breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and
to provide fair and reasonable compensation for breaches.
10. Despite the significant protections for Maori rights enshrined in the
provisions and principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, during most of the nineteenth
and part of the twentieth century, the British colonial and successor New Zealand
Governments carried out a series of acts and omissions that resulted in loss by
Maori of nearly all of the lands that they held at the time of the signing of the
Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. These acts and omissions are now widely recognized
as breaches of the Treaty.
B. Opportunity for real partnership
1. Maori participation in political decision-making
11. The Treaty of Waitangi has been interpreted as establishing a relationship
"akin to partnership" between the Government and the Maori;' the preamble of
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples similarly
recognizes that "treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and the
relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between
indigenous peoples and States".

I

New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General [ 1987] NZLR 641.
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(a) Participationat the nationallevel
12. Many see the partnership framework contemplated under the Treaty of
Waitangi as having been advanced, to varying degrees over time, by Maori
participation in the national Parliament, through various electoral arrangements,
though mostly by setting aside separate seats in the Parliament for Maori. Most
recently, the Electoral Act of 1993 makes the number of reserved seats
proportional to the number of Maori registered on the Maori electoral roll. After
the 2008 election, 16 per cent (20 members) of the 122 members of Parliament
identified themselves as Maori, a number proportional to the percentage of Maori
in the New Zealand population. The Maori Party, created in 2004, holds 5 of the
20 seats held by Maori in Parliament.
13. This guaranteed representation has provided Maori people with a
significant opportunity to influence decision-making at the national level, and it is
an important step towards advancing the partnership relationship between Maori
and the State. This system was commended by the former Special Rapporteur in
his 2006 report, when he noted that it "has broadened democracy in New Zealand
and should continue governing the electoral process in the country to ensure a
solid Maori voice in Parliament and guarantee democratic pluralism"
(E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, para. 17).
14. Yet, in practice, the New Zealand Parliament is still ruled by majority.
Because Maori do not constitute a majority in the country, Maori decision-making
at the national level is consistently vulnerable to overriding majority interests.
Also, while the provisions of the Electoral Act of 1993 regulating the general
electorate seats are entrenched, those provisions of the act concerning Maori seats
are not entrenched, meaning that they may be revoked by a simple act of
Parliament.

(b) Participationat the local level
15. While Maori representation at the national level provides an important
opportunity for Maori people to participate in decision-making, in what may be
seen as the type of partnership contemplated by the Treaty of Waitangi, for the
most part, this same opportunity does not exist at the local government level. The
number of Maori elected to local government is not proportional to their
percentage of the population, with less than 5 per cent of local government
positions held by Maori prior to the 2007 local government elections. 2

2
New Zealand, Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Maori Development), Whaiwa5hi ki
nga Poti a-rohe: Participate in Local Elections, (July 2007), p. 1. Available from
www.tpk.govt.nz/en/in-print/our-publications/fact-sheets/localelections/download/tpklocalelections-2007-en.pdf.
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16. The Local Government Act of 2002 (No. 84) allows for local
governments to adopt measures to facilitate participation of Maori, "in order to
recognise and respect the Crown's responsibility to take appropriate account of
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and to maintain and improve opportunities
for Maori to contribute to local government decision-making processes" (sect. 4).
However, no local councils have established special electoral arrangements for
Maori under the Act since it came into force, even though a number have
considered the option.
17. A major concern communicated to the Special Rapporteur is the decision
by the Government to not guarantee Maori electoral seats in the Auckland
"Supercity" Council. In its report on Auckland governance, the Royal
Commission on Auckland Governance-a body formed by the Government to
provide recommendations on the formation of the Auckland City Councilrecognized that "Maori constitute a unique community of interest with special
status as a partner under the Treaty of Waitangi"' and recommended that Maori be
guaranteed seats on the Auckland City Council. However, in the Local
Government (Auckland Council) Amendment Act of 2010 (No. 36), the
Government chose not to adopt the Royal Commission's recommendation, opting
instead to establish a Maori Advisory Board with a non-binding consultative role
before the council. The Government has emphasized that the Local Government
Act of 2002 can be used to ensure specific Maori seats on the new Auckland
Council if the council chooses to do so, although this is not guaranteed.
18. The Bay of Plenty, a region where Maori people make up 28 per cent of
the population, presents a contrasting unique arrangement for Maori participation
at the local level. In 2001, following a bill advanced by the Maori Regional
Representation Committee, an advisory body to the Bay of Plenty Regional
Council, Parliament passed the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Maori
Constituency Empowering) Act (No. 1), establishing a system under which Maori
in the region may register on a separate Maori electoral roll and the number of
Maori councillors is determined by the number of Maori registered on that roll. Of
the 13 councillors currently elected to the Bay of Plenty, 3 are from Maori
constituencies.

2. Consultation with Maori in decisions that affect them
19. The duty to consult with Maori people has been described as inherent in
the Treaty of Waitangi, and as part of the overarching principles of partnership
and active protection. 4 However, the duty to consult is not regarded as absolute;
the New Zealand Court of Appeal has stated that "in truth the notion of an

3 Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, report on Auckland governance
(Auckland, 2009), chap. 22, para. 22.2.
4
New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 687.
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absolute open-ended and formless duty to consult is incapable of practical
fulfilment and cannot be regarded as implicit in the Treaty".' According to the
Court, the duty to consult with Maori will vary according to the circumstances of
the case, and "in some [cases] extensive consultation and co-operation will be
necessary. In others ... [the State] may have sufficient information in its
possession for it to act consistently with the principles of the Treaty without any
specific consultation". 6
20. In this connection, consultations with Maori have taken place or are
required in the following contexts, among others:
(a) At the local level, under the Local Government Act,
councils have the general obligation to "establish and
maintain processes to provide opportunities for Maori to
contribute to the decision-making processes of the local
authority" (sect. 81 (a));
(b) Various laws and policies in New Zealand require the
Government to consult with Maori, to varying degrees, in
relation to decision-making about lands, resources,
fisheries, and conservation, among other matters. Most
notably, the Resource Management Act of 1991 (No. 69)1
requires that regional councils consult with iwi authorities
at various stages under the Act, including during the
development of resource management plans.
(c) The Government holds nationwide or regional public
consultation procedures to collect Maori views on various
initiatives, as it did with the review of the Foreshore and
Seabed Act and on the issue of Maori participation on the
Auckland City Council.
(d) Maori consultative or advisory bodies have been formed to
assist in policy development on certain issues. For example,
working groups of iwi leaders, which operate under the
purview of the Iwi Leaders Forum, have been formed to
engage in negotiations with the Government on strategic
issues including climate change, freshwater management,
the foreshore and seabed, and the Whanau Ora programme
(discussed in para. 65 below).
(e) As part of some Treaty settlements, the State and Maori
share management and decision-making responsibilities in
relation to natural resources. For example, as part of the
Waikato-Tainui settlement, the State and iwi share
s
6

Ibid., p. 683.
Ibid.
As at 1November 2010.
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responsibilities for governing and managing the Waikato
River.' Also, in relation to the Te Arawa Lakes, consent of
both the Te Arawa iwi and the State is required before
persons may build or modify structures on the lakebeds. 9
21. Despite these arrangements, even when the State has a duty to consult
under a specific law or policy, consultation procedures appear to be applied
inconsistently, and are not always in accordance with traditional Maori decisionmaking procedures, which tend to involve extensive discussion focused on
consensus-building. Finally, there are complaints of several barriers to the
effective participation of Maori in decision-making, including inadequate
technical capacity at times, the costs affiliated with ongoing negotiations, and
often, the lack of political will to implement what are perceived as "special
measures" for Maori people.

C. Remedies for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi
22. The settlement of grievances for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi is
carried out through two principal, complementary mechanisms: the Waitangi
Tribunal and Treaty settlement negotiations with the Government. Although not
addressed in detail in the present report, New Zealand courts can also provide
remedies for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi by directly applying the Treaty
provisions where these have been incorporated in legislation, by using the Treaty
to interpret legislation and, in theory, by applying the doctrine of aboriginal title to
protect rights to land and resources, though this has not yet happened in practice.

1. The Waitangi Tribunal
23. The Waitangi Tribunal was established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act
of 1975 (No. 114) with the mandate to hear claims brought by Maori against the
Government alleging breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Tribunal is charged
with determining the validity of such claims and making recommendations to the
Government for redress of valid claims (sect. 5). Initially, the Tribunal was
established to inquire into complaints made only about current and future actions
by the State, but in 1985 Parliament expanded the Tribunal's jurisdiction to also
inquire into complaints about historical grievances dating back to 1840.10 The
New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, "Background reports for the United
Nations Special Rapporteur" (12 July 2010), p. 12.
9
Contribution of New Zealand to the Study of the Expert Mechanism on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making, para. 14.
10 Treaty of Waitangi Act, sect. 6, para. 1, as amended by the Treaty of Waitangi
Amendment Act 1985 (No. 148).
8
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Waitangi Tribunal also has an urgency procedure for claimants who can
demonstrate immediate prejudice and no alternative for redress.
24. Since the visit of the former Special Rapporteur, the Treaty of Waitangi
Act was amended to set 1 September 2008 as a cut-off date for the submission of
historical claims" to the Waitangi Tribunal.' 2 According to the Government, this
was linked to the Government's aim to settle historical claims by 2020, a goal date
that has since been pushed forward to 2014 and was set at least in part in response
to Maori concerns regarding the length of the Treaty settlement process. At the
same time, many Maori have criticized the Government for unilaterally and,
according to some, arbitrarily, setting this date, and have expressed concern that
claims will be too hastily pushed through the settlement process, potentially
resulting in unfair settlements. According to the Waitangi Tribunal, a total of
1,834 new claims were lodged in the final four weeks leading up to 1 September
2008, more than the entire total of 1,579 claims registered over the previous 32
years since the Tribunal's foundation in 1976. As of mid-2010, the total case load
before the Waitangi Tribunal was 3,490 claims.' 3
25. Waitangi Tribunal proceedings in each case generally take between three
and four years, though many settlements have taken much longer, and culminate
in the issuance of a public report by the Tribunal. The report sets out whether the
claims are well-founded and may make recommendations on how relief might be
provided, including through negotiated settlement with the Government. At any
time during the procedure the claimants may choose to negotiate directly with the
Government in advance or in the absence of a Tribunal decision, which has
allowed some Maori groups to enter into agreements with the Crown more quickly
than they might through completing the Waitangi Tribunal process. However,
avoiding the Waitangi Tribunal process also means that a detailed public report on
the case documenting the history of the claim will not be issued.
26. The principal concern with respect to the Waitangi Tribunal
communicated to the Special Rapporteur, both by Maori representatives and by
members of the Waitangi Tribunal, is that it is significantly under-resourced. This
has resulted in a huge backlog of claims and significant delays in the processing of
claims. Many Maori also complained that the Waitangi Tribunal procedures are
too slow and that the Government further exacerbates delays in the process by
taking an adversarial approach in most cases. In this connection, the Special
Rapporteur notes information from the Government that an increase of 25 per cent
in resources was made in 2007 in order to assist the timely resolution of claims.
27. Another concern expressed to the Special Rapporteur is that the Waitangi
Tribunal's recommendations are generally not binding on the executive or the

I Historical claims are statutorily defined as claims relating to acts or omissions by
the Crown prior to 21 September 1992.
12
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (No. 114) (as at 5 August 2009), section 6AA.
13
As of April 2010. Waitangi Tribunal, Current Status of the Waitangi Tribunal's
Inquiry Programme (July 2010).
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legislature 4 and are frequently ignored or criticized by the Government, as was
initially the case with the Tribunal's report in the case of the Foreshore and
Seabed Act, which is discussed in paras. 52-56 below. However, some have
expressed that making the Waitangi Tribunal's reports legally binding would
significantly change the nature of the Tribunal's work and may prompt the
Government to restrict its mandate. Also, given the complexity and difficulty of
Treaty settlement, some have argued that it is preferable that Maori leaders
themselves make judgments about settlements and these decisions should not be
imposed by the Tribunal.
28. In any case, the Special Rapporteur observes that the Government's
adherence with the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal should be part of
its obligations to cooperate in good faith with the Maori and is an important
confidence-building gesture. Further, if the Government chooses not to follow the
Tribunal's recommendations in a specific situation, it should provide a
justification for this decision and still act in accordance with Treaty principles and
international human rights standards.
29. Despite these issues, overall, the Waitangi Tribunal has provided
enormous benefits for all of New Zealand by helping to provide redress for Maori
grievances. The Waitangi Tribunal has facilitated significant reparations for Maori
grievances in relation to both current and historical breaches of the Treaty of
Waitangi. The reports themselves represent an impressive documentation of the
history of breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and offer an important analysis of
the path forward for redress and reconciliation. Finally, the role of the Waitangi
Tribunal in providing a forum for Maori to present their issues in detail to the
Government and to receive a response plays an important role in the reconciliation
between Maori, the wider New Zealand society, and the State.
30. Given that the cut-off date for the submission of Maori historical claims
expired on 1 September 2008, the future role of the Waitangi Tribunal is
uncertain. It is unclear whether, after working through its current caseload, the
Waitangi Tribunal will concentrate only on modem grievances, or whether its role
will evolve to address other issues connected with Treaty of Waitangi.

2. Negotiated Treaty settlement with the Crown
31. Proceedings before the Waitangi Tribunal and a decision validating a
claim typically are precursors to settlement negotiations with the Government.
Although Maori groups may choose to enter into settlement negotiations at any
time after a claim is registered with the Waitangi Tribunal, the process generally
starts after the Tribunal issues its report in the case. Participation in negotiations is
voluntary and all groups are free to withdraw at any time.

14
With two exceptions: the Tribunal can direct that State-owned enterprise lands
and Crown forest lands be returned to Maori, although this is rarely done.
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(a) Positive developments
32.
Since the Treaty settlement process was developed in the 1990s,
numerous Maori groups have negotiated settlements to their historical grievances
with the Government. As of July 2010, the Government has reached a full or
partial Treaty settlement with 27 iwi, and 35 iwi have yet to reach a settlement,
although most of these are currently engaged in pre-negotiations or intensive
negotiations with the Government." To date, over NZ$1 billion has been
committed to final and comprehensive settlements and several partial
settlements.' 6 Treaty settlements cover 61 per cent of the total land area of New
Zealand. The Crown assists claimant groups by providing funds for all stages of
settlement negotiations in addition to whatever financial redress settlement is
ultimately agreed upon.
33.
Since the visit of the previous Special Rapporteur, the Government has
taken several steps to improve the Treaty settlement process. For example, the
Government has hired an increased number of high-level negotiators, so that the
negotiations can take place at the "rangatirato rangatira"("chief to chief") level,
in accordance with Maori cultural practices. In addition, the Office of Treaty
Settlements is, in most cases, drafting the deeds of settlements and enacting
legislation at the same time, in order to reduce the time between the signing of the
settlements and the settlement legislation being introduced into Parliament." The
Government is also developing a programme to provide iwi leaders with
assistance to boost their capacity in the Treaty settlement process.'" Furthermore,
as noted above, the Government has committed to settle all outstanding
agreements with iwi by 2014, six years earlier than the previous Government's
deadline, and has committed increased funding of NZ$22.4 million over the
period from 2010 to 2014 to assist in meeting this goal.' 9
34.
The Government has also taken some measures to open up more issues to
the negotiation process, one example being the Crown's policy with respect to
conservation sites. Under the Crown's 1994 policy, the transfer of ownership of
Crown-owned conservation land was limited to "small and discrete sites".
However, recognizing that the former policy did not adequately recognize the
dislocation of Maori from ancestral sites, the Government amended its policy to
provide negotiators with more flexibility to bear in mind the connection of iwi to

1s

New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, "Background report" (note 8 above),

p. 10.

.

16
New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, "Four Monthly Report: November
2009-February 20 10", p. 4
17
New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, "Background report" (note 8 above),
p. 11.
18

ibid.

'9

Human Rights Commission, Treaty of Waitangi: 2009 in Review, p. I1.
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certain public conservation land, to allow for settlement packages that include
participation of iwi in conservation management, transfer of ownership of lands
and sites, and to allow statutory acknowledgement of iwi connections to particular
sites.

(b) Ongoingconcerns

35. While it is evident that numerous iwi have benefitted from the Treaty
settlement process in important respects, the Special Rapporteur heard numerous
concerns about it. An overarching concern is that the negotiation procedure is
flawed from the outset because the party responsible for the breaches of the Treaty
of Waitangi-the Government-is wholly responsible for determining the
framework policies and procedures for redress for those breaches, resulting in a
situation that is inherently imbalanced and unfair to Maori.
36. Among the more specific concerns is that the Government determines the
group with which it will negotiate, and that it has a policy to negotiate claims with
"large natural groupings" rather than individual whanau and hapu. According to
the Government, "this makes the process of settlement easier to manage and work
through, and helps deal with overlapping interests" as well as helps reduce costs
for both the Government and claimants.2 0 Further, the Government points out that
some specific agreements can be made as to individual whanau or hapu within the
framework of the larger agreement, although this is not very common.
37. However, Maori groups communicated that the Government's approach
often overlooks the specific claims of smaller groups. The Special Rapporteur
received information about the particular situation of members of the Ruawaipu,
Ngati Uepohatu and Te Aitanga-a-Hauiti iwi, who have grievances in the East
Coast District, but who do not consider themselves to be represented by the group
the Government is negotiating with to settle grievances in that area. This has
reportedly resulted in the "serious likelihood that redress for [their] grievances
will be given to others, and their claims will be disposed of without being heard or
adjudicated when legislation is introduced to implement the settlement". 21
38. Maori groups have also reported that the Government's settlement policy
redefines existing culturally based traditional hapu and iwi structures and
traditional leadership structures, which in some instances has caused conflict or
division among Maori groups. In this connection, the Waitangi Tribunal has
expressed concern over the approach of the Government in negotiating with Maori
groups during the settlement process, noting that in the particular case of the Te

20
New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, Healing the Past, Building a Future:
A Guide to the Treaty of Waitangi Claims and Negotiations with the Crown, 2nd edition

(Wellington, 2002), p. 44.
21
Linda Thorton, Tamaki Legal Barristers and Solicitors, letter to the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and indigenous people, 19 July 2010.
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Arawa, "Te Arawa is now in a state of turmoil as a result [of the Treaty settlement
negotiations]. Hapu are in contest with other hapu and the preservation of tribal
relationships has been adversely affected. We are left fearing for the customary
future of the Te Arawa Waka as a result".2 2 In another case, the Waitangi Tribunal
made the troubling observation that although the Treaty settlement process is
supposed to improve Maori-State relationships, "what we are seeing ... is that the
process of settling is damaging more relationships than it is improving".23
39. Another concern is that the Government wholly defines what and how
much redress is available to settle historical claims. Government policy clarifies
that "the Crown has to set limits on what and how much redress is available to
settle historical claims. Redress must be fair, affordable, and practicable in today's
circumstances". 2 4 Most settlement packages have included an apology by the
Crown, and some form of cultural redress and financial compensation.2 5
40. However, Maori have expressed concern that the value of the settlements
is grossly out of proportion to the value of what has been taken from them,
amounting only to an estimated I to 3 per cent of the value of their total loss.
Further, the Government will not consider rights over certain resources, including
oil and gas, as the basis of redress packages. (In this connection, the Waitangi
Tribunal has clearly found that "it is in breach of Treaty principle for the Crown to
exclude petroleum-based remedies from settlements".2 6 ) While, as noted in
paragraph 34 above, the Government has recently shown more flexibility in
considering remedies for the loss of certain resources, such as culturally
significant sites within conservation areas, it is evident that much more needs to
be done in this regard to satisfy Maori claimants.
41. Finally, under the Government settlement policy, all settlements of
historical grievances, that is, those arising from acts or omissions by the
Government before 21 September 1992, are final; in exchange for the settlement
redress, the settlement legislation will prevent the courts, the Waitangi Tribunal,
or any other judicial body or tribunal from re-opening the historical claims.
According to the Government, the lack of review promotes the finality of
settlement agreements, making the procedure as effective and efficient as possible,
and helping achieve the sense of final resolution that the settlement process is
designed to facilitate. The Government has also pointed out that nothing precludes
the claimant group or one of its members from pursuing modern claims against
Waitangi Tribunal, Report on the Impact of the Crown's Treaty Settlement Policy
on Te Arawa Waka, Wai 1353 (2007), p. 195.
23
Waitangi Tribunal, The Tamaki Makaurau Settlement Process Report, Wai 1362
(Wellington, Legislation Direct, 2007), p. 1.
24
New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, Healing the Past, Building a Future:
A Guide to the Treaty of Waitangi Claims and Negotiations with the Crown, summary
edition (Wellington), p. 15.
25
Ibid., p. 43.
26
Waitangi Tribunal, "The petroleum report, Wai 796" (Wellington, Legislation
Direct, 2003), p. 79.
22

New Zealand Country Report

15

the Crown. However, Maori express serious concern about the lack of
independent and impartial oversight of the settlement outcomes. This lack of
independent review contributes to a feeling on the part of Maori of an imbalance
of power in the settlement process, as well as a feeling that the settlement process
is at times unfair.
42. The Special Rapporteur understands that there are many difficulties and
complexities involved in the Government's laudable effort to provide redress for
historical grievances through negotiated Treaty settlement. Nevertheless, the
aforementioned concerns have fomented an uneasiness and mistrust by Maori of
the Treaty settlement process, which may have negative implications for
achieving the important goals of redress and reconciliation that the process is
designed to advance. The Special Rapporteur observes that increasing Maori
participation in and influence over settlement policies, procedures, and outcomes
could go a long way in alleviating the apparent discontent in the Treaty settlement
process felt by Maori groups.

D. Settlements and outstanding cases
43. There have been several noteworthy settlements reached by specific iwi
groups as well as pan-Maori settlements. Among these is the fisheries case, which
took years to settle and followed a 1992 report by the Waitangi Tribunal in the
Ngai Tahu fisheries claim.27 The settlement provides Maori with an interest in half
of New Zealand's largest fishing company and allocates Maori with 23 per cent of
the existing fishing quota, plus 20 per cent of all fishing quota issued in the future.
Another example is the Commercial Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act of 2004
(No. 107), under which the Crown will provide Maori with the equivalent of 20
per cent of aquaculture space in the coastal marine area. While there have been
some controversial aspects of these settlements, most notably that all present and
future claims to commercial fishing and commercial aquaculture sites are
considered fully settled, overall, these settlements have already provided
significant benefits to the Maori as a whole and are expected to continue to do so
in the future.
44. The Special Rapporteur was also informed about several cases that are
pending before the Waitangi Tribunal or the subject of settlement negotiations
with the Crown. Many of these pending cases entail difficult challenges to
settlement that are yet to be overcome, as exemplified by the following cases:
(a) Whanganui iwi. In 1999, following a claim lodged by the
Whanganui iwi, the Waitangi Tribunal issued the Whanganui River
Report, recommending to the Government that "the authority of [the
iwi] in the Whanganui River should be recognized in appropriate

27

"Ngi Tahu Sea fisheries report, Wai-27" (Wellington, Brooker and Friend, 1992).
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legislation. It should include recognition of the [iwi] right of
ownership of the Whanganui River, as an entity and as a resource,
without reference to the English legal conception of river ownership
in terms of riverbeds".28 In September 2009, the Whanganui entered
into settlement negotiations with the Government over the
Whanganui River. The iwi are seeking to co-manage the river in
partnership with local councils and government agencies, in a way
that benefits the cultural, environmental, social, political, and
economic development of the iwi;
(b) Ngati Tuhoe. Tuhoe is one of the largest iwis, comprising some
32,670 people, and is also one of the poorest iwi communities in
New Zealand, scoring at the lowest level of the Government's
development index.2 9 A two-part report by the Waitangi Tribunal,
part I published in 2009 and part 2 in 2010, documents the
continued confiscations of land within the Te Urewera region from
1860 to around the 1950s. The Waitangi Tribunal determined that
these acts resulted in breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, but
refrained from making recommendations for redress. For more than
two years, Tuhoe have been involved in negotiations with the
Government for redress of their historical grievances. Tuhoe were
very close to reaching a settlement that included the return of
ownership of land within the Te Urewera National Park, but in May
2010 the Government changed course and announced that it would
not transfer ownership of the national park, a last-minute decision
that was met with extreme disappointment on the part of Tuhoe.
Additionally, two cases currently pending assert claims on behalf of all Maori and
pose particular challenges to the Treaty settlement process. One of the longeststanding cases before the Waitangi Tribunal is the Flora and Fauna case (Wai
262), which involves a claim by Maori to property rights related to Maori
knowledge and indigenous flora and fauna, which they argue are guaranteed under
the Treaty of Waitangi. The rights involved are described as falling under four
main categories: matauranga Maori (traditional knowledge); Maori cultural
property (tangible manifestation of matauranga Maori); Maori intellectual and
cultural property rights; and rights to environmental, resource and conservation
management-including bio-prospecting and access to flora and fauna. Another
pan-Maori case currently pending settlement is the so-called Radio Spectrum case.
In this case, Maori claim to have a right to a fair and equitable share in the radio
spectrum resource. Maori are asking for reservation of a portion of the spectrum
and a portion of the future benefits that derive therefrom, although the specific

28
29

p. 16.

Wai 167, The Whanganui River Report, p. 343.

New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlement, "Background report" (note 8 above),
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allocations of spectrum and benefits are expected to be settled through
negotiations with the Government, as recommended by the Waitangi Tribunal. 30

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SECURITY OF MAORI RIGHTS
A. Lack of constitutional security of Maori rights

'

46. The concerns identified above relating to Maori participation in decisionmaking and the Treaty settlement process lend support to the repeated call by
Maori that the principles enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi and related
internationally protected human rights be provided with constitutional security.
For years, Maori representatives have expressed that their rights are too vulnerable
to political discretion, resulting in their perpetual insecurity and instability. This
vulnerability has been underscored in recent actions by the Parliament, including
the passage of the Foreshore and Seabed Act in 2004, and the Government's
support of a bill in Parliament in 2006, as part of an agreement with a minority
political party, which proposed to delete the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi
from all legislation-though this bill was defeated by the Parliament's Select
Committee at its second reading.
47. In particular, there has been a persistent call by Maori for constitutional
change to give greater security to the Treaty of Waitangi and Maori rights. While
the Treaty is judicially enforceable to the extent that it has been incorporated in
various pieces of legislation, it cannot be used to repeal or invalidate legislation.
The lack of constitutional security of the provisions and principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi was a principle focus of the report of the former Special Rapporteur.3
Likewise, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
recommended in its concluding observations that New Zealand "continue the
public discussion over the status of the Treaty of Waitangi, with a view to its
possible entrenchment as a constitutional norm" (CERD/C/NZL/CO/17, para. 13).
48. Other rights, specifically those enshrined in the Bill of Rights Act of
1990 (No. 109) (which guarantees mostly civil and political rights, including the
rights of minorities) and in the Human Rights Act of 1993 (No. 82) (which
guarantees the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of race), are similarly
not enforceable as against the legislature. Further, both these Acts can be amended
by a simple majority of Parliament.
49. However, the Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act do include a
few safeguards to provide some security to the rights contained in those
instruments. Under the Bill of Rights Act, courts are required to construe
enactments as consistent with the Act, where possible (sect. 6). Also under the Bill
of Rights Act, the Attorney General may bring to the attention of the House of
30
31

Wai 2224.
See, for example, E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, para. 10.
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Representatives any provision of draft legislation that appears to be inconsistent
with any of the rights guaranteed under the Act (sect. 7). In addition, the Human
Rights Act allows for a declaration by the Human Rights Review Tribunal that
legislation is inconsistent with the right to freedom from discrimination. The
Special Rapporteur notes that, at a minimum, the development of similar checks
would be important in the context of the Treaty of Waitangi.
50. Yet even if legislation is found to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights
or Human Rights Act there is no requirement for the Government to modify or
repeal the inconsistent legislation. In this connection, the Human Rights
Committee, in its concluding observations, noted with concern that "it is possible,
under the terms of the Bill of Rights, to enact legislation that is incompatible with
the provisions of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]", and
regretted that "this appears to have been done in a few cases, thereby depriving
victims of any remedy under domestic law" (CCPR/CO/75/NZL, para. 8). The
Human Rights Committee recommended that New Zealand "take appropriate
measures to implement all the Covenant rights in domestic law and to ensure that
every victim of a violation of Covenant rights has a remedy in accordance with
article 2 of the Covenant" (ibid.).
51. In order to address concerns related to the lack of domestic legal security
for Maori rights, among other reasons, the Government is planning to undertake a
constitutional review process, which will include a review of "Maori
representation, the role of the Treaty of Waitangi and whether New Zealand needs
a written constitution," among other issues.3 2 The Special Rapporteur will
continue to follow this constitutional review process with great interest and hopes
that it continues to be the subject of concerted action on the part of the
Government.

B. The Foreshore and Seabed Act
52. A notable example of the lack of security of Maori rights is the passage
of the Foreshore and Seabed Act in 2004. The Act vested the ownership of the
public foreshore and seabed in the Government, thereby extinguishing any Maori
customary title over that area, while private fee simple title over the foreshore and
seabed remained unaffected. Also of particular concern was that Maori people
were not adequately consulted about the Act and there was no avenue for redress
by the courts for the extinguishment of Maori customary rights to the foreshore
and seabed.
53. In his report, the previous Special Rapporteur recommended the repeal or
amendment of the Foreshore and Seabed Act and that the Government engage in
Treaty settlement negotiations with Maori regarding their customary rights and
interests in the foreshore and seabed (E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, para. 92). The Act
32
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was also the subject of criticism by United Nations treaty bodies, including the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 33
54. In November 2009, the Prime Minister announced that the Government
would repeal the Act providing that a suitable replacement regime could be
developed. Various actions have been taken to address the concerns brought forth
by this law, including a nationwide consultation by an independent Ministerial
Review Panel in 2009 which concluded that the law was unfair, discriminatory
and needed to be repealed. The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill
was introduced into the House of Representatives in late 2010 to replace the
Foreshore and Seabed Act. The bill was passed into law in March 2011.
55. According to information received, the new bill is meant to restore the
customary interests extinguished by the Foreshore and Seabed Act. In order to
obtain customary marine title, a Maori group must prove it has used and occupied
the area claimed according to custom (tikanga), without substantial interruption
from 1840 to the present day, and to the exclusion of others. Also, the bill contains a
burden of proof clause that states that a customary interest will be deemed to not
have been extinguished, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
56. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur emphasizes the need for the
law to be in line with international standards regarding the rights of indigenous
peoples to their traditional lands and resources. It is of note that the bill is the first
legislation to be introduced into Parliament that affects indigenous rights since
New Zealand's expression of support for the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Special Rapporteur notes that the bill still
allows for certain past acts of extinguishment of Maori rights to have effect, and
he reminds the Government that the extinguishment of indigenous rights by
unilateral, uncompensated acts is inconsistent with the Declaration. In addition,
concern has been expressed that the bill only requires the Government to
"acknowledge" 34 rather than "give effect" to the Treaty of Waitangi, the latter
being understood to establish a stronger, positive obligation on the part of the
Government to promote the Treaty and its principles, as required in some other
legislation. Also of concern for some Maori representatives is that the limit of
six years to assert customary interest claims (sect. 98, clause 2) may have the
effect of barring some legitimate claims.

33
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, decision 1 (66) on
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1), para. 7.
34
Sect. 4, clause (1)(d).
3
See, for example, sect. 4 of the Conservation Act 1987 (No. 65).
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V. MAORI DEVELOPMENT
57. The Special Rapporteur cannot help but note the extreme disadvantage in
the social and economic conditions of Maori people in comparison to the rest of
New Zealand society. This disadvantage, which manifests itself across a range of
indicators, including education, health and income, is certainly detrimental to
Maori people's ability to act in partnership with the Crown, as contemplated under
the Treaty of Waitangi. The Special Rapporteur notes that this disadvantage
especially manifests itself among Maori living in urban areas.

A. Positive developments and ongoing challenges in priority areas
1. Language and education
58. Since the visit of the previous Special Rapporteur, Government
initiatives related to Maori education have incorporated the involvement of Maori
communities, including whanau and iwi, in education programmes. New
Zealand's revised school curriculum of 2007 was developed alongside a
companion document, Te Marautangao Aotearoa, which sets out the curriculum
for schools that conduct classes in the Maori language and emphasizes the
importance of these schools working within whanau, iwi and hapu. Also, Ka
Hikitia - Managing for Success: The Maori Education Strategy 2008-2012,
includes among its main focus areas increasing the learning and capacity of
teachers, placing resourcing and priorities in Maori language in education, and
36
increasing whanau and iwi authority and involvement in education.
59. There have been many key improvements in Maori education since the
2006 report of the previous Special Rapporteur. For example, from 2006 to 2009,
Maori participation in early childhood education increased from 89.9 per cent to
91.4 per cent; the percentage of Maori students qualified to attend university after
leaving secondary education increased from 14.8 per cent to 20.8 per cent; and the
percentage of Maori students staying in school until the age of at least 17 and a
half increased from 38.9 per cent to 45.8 per cent." However, the education
achievement of Maori children still lags behind that of other New Zealanders,
particularly in early childhood education and in secondary school retention.
60. The vibrancy of the Maori language has also showed signs of significant
improvement over the past few decades, in significant part due to Maori-run and
Government revitalization initiatives, as discussed in some detail in the report of
36
For
an
overview
of
the
Strategy,
see
www.minedu.govt.nz/theMinistry/PolicyAndStrategy/KaHikitial
StrategyOverview/HowThingsWillChange.aspx.
3
All statistics from New Zealand, Ministry of Education, "Progress against Maori
Education Plan targets: Ka Hikitia - Managing for Success". Available from
www.educationcounts.govt.nz/themes/maori-education/3 1351/36805.
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the former Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, paras. 60-65). One
notable example of such an effective initiative is Maori Television, which was
created in 2004 following years of efforts by Maori representatives and litigation
before the Waitangi Tribunal. Maori Television currently has an average monthly
audience of over 1.6 million viewers, a figure that is steadily climbing.38 Still,
according to a 2006 study on the health of the Maori language, despite significant
improvements in the last couple of decades, only 23 per cent of Maori and 4 per
39
cent of all New Zealanders have conversational Maori language abilities.
Therefore, "although there is evidence of the re-emergence of intergenerational
Maori language transmission, this is only at the initial budding stage and is not the
norm in Maori society. Accordingly, if the Maori language is to flourish,
40
conscious effort at all levels ... remains a necessary requirement".

2. Health
61. Since the visit of the previous Special Rapporteur, the Government has
rolled out Whakatataka Tuarua: Maori Health Action Plan (2006-2011) and He
Korowai Oranga: Maori Health Strategy, which provides a framework for the
public sector to support the health of Maori whanau. Yet, according to all
available indicators, Maori continue to experience higher levels of many health
problems than non-Maori, including disproportionate levels of cancer, diabetes,
heart failure and communicable diseases. From 2005 to 2007, male life
4
expectancy at birth was 79.0 years for non-Maori, but 70.4 years for Maori. 1
Female life expectancy at birth was 83.0 years for non-Maori and 75.1 years for
Maori.4 2 Infant mortality rates are higher for Maori than Asian or European New
43
Zealanders, and rates of childhood vaccination are lower among Maori. Maori
also continue to experience higher levels of drug and alcohol abuse," suicide (20
per cent of national suicides in 2007), smoking (more than twice the national rate
45
at 46 per cent) and obesity (nearly twice the national rate at 43 per cent). Maori
are also nearly three times as likely as non-Maori to die as the result of an assault,

38

2008-09 data.

New Zealand, Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Maori Development), The Health of
the Maori Language in 2006 (2008), p. 35.
39
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New Zealand, Ministry of Social Development, 2010 The Social Report
(Wellington, 2010), p. 26. Available from www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/documents/thesocial-report-20 I 0.pdf www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsflindexmh/an-indication-nz-health-2007.
42
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New Zealand, Ministry of Health, An Indication of New Zealanders'Health2007
(Wellington, 2007), p. 11.
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New Zealand, Ministry of Social Development, 2010 The Social Report (note 41
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with nearly 20 per cent of Maori women reporting being assaulted or threatened
by an intimate partner, three times the national average. 46
3. Administration of justice
62. Regrettably, there has been little change in the incarceration rate of
Maori since the previous Special Rapporteur's visit. As of February 2010, Maori
comprised just over 51 per cent of the prison population of New Zealand, despite
the fact that Maori make up only about 14 per cent of the total population. 47 Maori
youth also make up around 50 per cent of all youth offenders despite Maori being
only about a quarter of the New Zealand population under 17 years of age. This
figure is even higher for women; Maori women make up nearly 60 per cent of the
female prison population, although it should be noted that the total female prison
population is still quite low. 4 8 In addition to the negative impacts on individual
incarcerated individuals and their families, high incarceration rates have a
potentially significant impact on Maori political participation, as the New Zealand
electoral law specifies that citizens who have been sentenced and imprisoned lose
their voting rights.
63. The Special Rapporteur is encouraged to learn that the Government is
taking targeted action to address this distressing situation. In January 2009, the
Department of Corrections established the Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Service, which provides a number of programmes and services specifically aimed
at reducing the rate at which Maori re-offend through the use of tikanga Maori
(customary Maori) concepts and values, including therapeutic programmes and
programmes that aim to establish links between prisoners, their whanau, hapu and
iwi, and the local Maori community prior to release. Still, given the severity of the
situation, it is evident that more remains to be done.

4. Economic Development
64. Maori own significant commercial assets that provide economic benefits
for iwi and for all of New Zealand. The Treaty settlement process has been
instrumental in helping provide Maori groups with an economic base for their
future economic development. Still, there are numerous obstacles to Maori
economic development, exacerbated by the recent global economic downturn. In
the year to September 2010, the unemployment rate for Maori in 2010 was 14 per
cent (compared with 6.6 per cent in New Zealand overall), 2.8 per cent higher
lbid., pp. 103-105.
New Zealand, "Visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur to Aotearoa New
Zealand, 18-23 July 2010, pre-visit/background reading", p. 9.
48
Ibid.
46

47
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than the previous year and 5.1 per cent higher than its level five years ago. 49 Also,
among 15-24 year olds, 20 per cent of Maori males and 16.1 per cent of Maori
females were not employed, in education or in training, compared with 11.1 per
cent of all males and 9.6 per cent of females in New Zealand overall in this age
group.50

B. Whanau Ora
65. A promising new initiative for reducing the Maori disadvantage is the
Whanau Ora programme. Whanau means extended family, and Whanau Ora is
designed to use family as the basic unit of intervention to tackle social problems
experienced by the Maori in an integrated and holistic way. The programme
brings together service providers in the areas of employment, child, youth and
family, health, education, and social development, as well as law enforcement and
Maori extended families to effectively deliver whanau-centred services. New
Zealand has committed NZ$134.3 million over four years to the establishment of
the programme. Importantly, Maori will be closely involved in the management of
the programme. The Government created the Whanau Integration, Innovation and
Engagement Fund, with dedicated resources to administer whanau-centred service
delivery, which will be governed by Maori.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
66. Especially in recent years, New Zealand has made significant strides
to advance the rights of Maori people and to address concerns raised by the
former Special Rapporteur in his 2006 report (E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3). These
include New Zealand's expression of support for the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, its steps to repeal and
reform the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004 and its efforts to carry out a
constitutional review process with respect to constitutional issues including
Maori representation and the role of the Treaty of Waitangi.
67. Additionally, the Treaty settlement process in New Zealand, despite
evident shortcomings, is one of the most important examples in the world of
an effort to address historical and ongoing grievances of indigenous peoples,
and settlements already achieved have provided significant benefits in several
cases.

-

49
New Zealand, Department of Labour, Maori Labour Market Factsheet
September 2010. Available from www.dol.govt.nz/publications/Imr/archive/quick-factssep-10/maori.asp.
50
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A. Issues related to the Treaty of Waitangi
1. Partnership and participation
68. The Special Rapporteur welcomes New Zealand's efforts to secure
Maori political participation at the national level. However, these efforts
should be strengthened, and the State should focus special attention on
increasing Maori participation in local governance. The Government should
consider reversing its decision to reject the findings of the Royal Commission
on Auckland Governance and guarantee Maori seats on the Auckland City
Council.
69. New Zealand should ensure that consultations with Maori on
matters affecting them are applied consistently, and in accordance with
relevant international standards and traditional Maori decision-making
procedures. Efforts should be made to reduce barriers to the effective
participation of Maori in decision-making, including by increasing the
technical capacity of Maori people and the funding necessary to ensure
Maori participation in consultations.

2. The Waitangi Tribunal
70. The Government should ensure the funding necessary for the
Waitangi Tribunal to resolve its pending caseload of historical grievances in
an efficient and timely manner and should consult with Maori people to
determine the future role of the Tribunal.
71. New Zealand should takes steps to ensure that the 2008 deadline for
the submission of historical claims does not have the effect of barring
legitimate claims and that the 2014 goal for settlement of all historical claims
does not compromise any settlement processes that could benefit from more
negotiating time.
72. Any decision by the Government to act against the recommendations
of the Waitangi Tribunal in a particular case should be accompanied by a
written justification and be in accordance with the principles of the Treaty
and international human rights standards.

3. Negotiated Treaty settlement
73. The Government should make every effort during Treaty settlement
negotiations to involve all groups that have an interest in the issues under
consideration. In order to address any conflicts regarding participation or
representation in settlement negotiations, the Government, in consultation
with Maori, should strengthen available mediation or other alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. The Government should take special
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measures to address the concerns of the Ruawaipu, Ngati Uepohatu and Te
Aitanga-a-Hauiti iwi, in relation to the East Coast District settlement case.
74. The Special Rapporteur encourages the Government to show
flexibility in its positions during settlement negotiations and to strive, as
appropriate, for creative solutions that provide adequate redress to Maori
claims in accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi and international
standards. In settlement negotiations the Government should give greater
consideration to the connection that Maori have with traditional lands and
resources.
75. In consultation with Maori, the Government should explore and
develop means of addressing Maori concerns regarding the Treaty settlement
negotiation process, especially the perceived imbalance of power between
Maori and Government negotiators. In this regard, consideration should be
given to the formation of an independent and impartial commission or
tribunal that would be available to review Treaty settlements.
76. The Special Rapporteur notes with concern the Government's
position not to return to Ngati Tuhoe their traditional lands within the Te
Urewera National Park. He urges the Government to reconsider this position
in the light of the merits of the Tuhoe claim and considerations of restorative
justice, and to not rule out the possibility of return of these lands to Tuhoe in
the future even if it is not included in a near-term settlement.

B. Domestic legal security for Maori rights
77. The principles enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi and related
internationally protected human rights should be provided security within
the domestic legal system of New Zealand so that these rights are not
vulnerable to political discretion. At a minimum, the development of
safeguards similar to those under the Bill of Rights Act would be important
in the context of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Special Rapporteur encourages
the Government to open up discussions with Maori as soon as possible
regarding the constitutional review process.
78. The Special Rapporteur is pleased to hear of recent legislative
developments aimed at addressing the concerns raised by Maori regarding
the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004. The Marine and Coastal Area Act
represents a notable effort to reverse some of the principal areas of concern
of the Foreshore and Seabed Act.
79. The Government should ensure that the provisions of the Marine
and Coastal Area Act, in particular those on customary rights, natural
resource management, protection of cultural objects and practices, and
access to judicial or other remedies for any actions that affect their
customary rights, are implemented in a way that is consistent with the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and international standards.
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C. Maori development
80. The Special Rapporteur applauds the availability of Maori language
instruction and acknowledges the continued support and resources made
available by the Ministry of Education for this effort. The Special
Rapporteur urges the Government to work to overcome the shortage of
teachers fluent in the Maori language and to continue to develop Maori
language programmes.
81. New Zealand should continue to support Maori Television, and
ensure that it does not become dependent on unpredictable advertising
revenue, which could have negative impacts on its ability to continue to
provide essential programming.
82. Available health statistics raise serious concerns that Maori are not
receiving the standard of health services received by other groups in New
Zealand. The Special Rapporteur encourages the Government to continue
work with whanau, iwi and Maori leaders to assess the causes of the
discrepancy in health conditions and identify possible culturally appropriate
solutions.
83. In consultation with Maori leaders, the Government should redouble
efforts to address the problem of high rates of incarceration among Maori.
Specific attention should be given to the disproportionate negative impacts on
Maori of any criminal justice initiatives that extend incarceration periods,
reduce opportunities for probation or parole, use social status as an
aggravating factor in sentencing, or otherwise increase the likelihood of
incarceration.
84. The Whanau Ora programme is a positive initiative for Maori
development that should receive ongoing support.
85. When addressing the issue of Maori social and economic
disadvantage, special attention should be placed on the situation of Maori
who live in urban areas, and the State should work closely with urban Maori
to address their particular concerns.

From Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples on the
situation of Maori people in New Zealand, by S. James Anaya, D 2011 United
Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

